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ABSTRACT 
Michael Friedman defines the scientific enterprise as an ongoing project with a dynamics of reason 
that persists through scientific revolutions: The coherence and continuity of science owes to a 
communicative rationality that is operative at all times. It assures us of our shared objective world 
by transforming subjective points of view into intersubjectively binding agreements. Though it 
takes a very broad approach epistemologically, this conception of science may yet be too narrow in 
respect to notions of objectivity. It excludes a prominent mode of knowledge production that might 
be called technoscientific. This exclusion becomes particularly evident in Friedman’s discussion of 
Heidegger as a critic of Cassirer and Carnap and as a critic of objectivity as “universal validity” of 
scientific propositions. If one tends to Heidegger’s own account of objectivity, one encounters a 
non-propositional notion of truth. Science is seen as a technology that brings forth phenomena and 
processes. Accordingly, even where modern physics appears to be concerned primarily with the 
formulation of theories and the testing of hypotheses, it uses mathematical and representational 
techniques to conceive and create the modern world. And more powerfully than intersubjective 
agreement, technologies assure us of the unity and objectivity of our simultaneously social as well 
as natural world. – There may be good reasons to hold fast to the close affiliation of communicative 
rationality, science, and enlightenment. However, to the extent that it turns a blind eye to 
technoscientific knowledge production and the technological character of science, a philosophy of 
technoscience needs to develop an alternative perspective on questions of objectivity, explanation, 
inference, or validation. 
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I.  BACKGROUND: HISTORY OF SCIENCE AND THE DYNAMICS OF REASON 
In a 1957-essay on the “Aim of Science,” Karl Popper considers what he calls the problem of depth 
in the discontinuous development of science. According to Popper, in the succession of theories, the 
new and more satisfactory ones explain the success of earlier theories while correcting them. His 
examples for this are taken from the history of physics, especially from Newton’s theory explaining 
and correcting those of Galileo and Kepler, and from Einstein’s theory explaining and correcting 
classical mechanics. The successor theory is “deeper” not because it entails the successor theory 
and thereby explains its success – for in that case, it would not be offering a genuine correction. 
Instead, though its conceptual structure differs markedly from the precursor theories, the new 
structure is deeper because it provides the means for grasping how the old structure worked and 
what it was doing. This increase of reflective depth establishes an asymmetry between successor 
and precursors theories – it is the reason why one can see the older theories only retrospectively as 
limiting cases of the new ones, and inversely, the new ones never as generalizations of the old ones 
(Popper, 1979, pp. 197-203). 
 Several years before Thomas Kuhn’s Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Popper thus offered a     
notion of continuity in the face of discontinuity. The search for ever more satisfactory theories is not 
just straightforwardly a gain in explanatory power but allows for retrospective evaluations of what 
came before: Along with its explanation of phenomena it provides an implicit account of the 
advancement of knowledge and of what makes the current theory superior to those that came 
before. 
 At first sight Popper’s proposal appears very much like Michael Friedman’s in The Dynamics of     
Reason. Friedman also suggests that a reconstruction of the conceptual development of successive 
scientific theories can show how previous theories are limiting cases of current scientific 
understanding (Friedman, 2001, p. 63). Popper and Friedman thus agree that the discontinuities, 
ruptures, or paradigm shifts within the theoretical development of the sciences do not disrupt the 
overall dynamics of reason that characterize the scientific enterprise: Scientific revolutions do not 
detract from the overall pursuit of satisfactory explanations as the aim of science. Hans Blumenberg 
speaks here of a “movement of knowledge” that persists without rupture through scientific 
revolutions and their paradigm-shifts (Blumenberg, 1976, p. 16).  1
 Blumenberg characterizes paradigm shifts as “a surrender of basic assumptions and the introduction of new 1
elementary suppositions, which get rid of a desperate situation but do not necessarily rupture the identity of the 
movement of knowledge that had culminated in that situation” – “der Prozeß der Erkenntnis selbst [erzwingt] die 
Preisgabe seiner Voraussetzungen und die Einführung neuer elementarer Annahmen, die den ausweglosen Zustand zwar 
beheben, nicht aber die Identität der in ihm aufgelaufenen Gesamtbewegung zu zerbrechen zwingen” (Blumenberg, 
1976, p. 16).
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 It was the intervention of Thomas Kuhn, of course, that separates Karl Popper and Michael     
Friedman. Kuhn’s work dramatizes the difficulty of maintaining the unity and continuity of the 
scientific enterprise when it is conceived as the search for more and more satisfying explanations of 
an enduring substrate of natural phenomena. Indeed, Kuhn makes it impossible to speak of 
“science” in the singular by suggesting that there are as many special sciences as there are 
paradigms that enable normal-scientific research activities. In light of Kuhn’s challenge, Popper’s 
proposal appears a bit simple-minded, indeed circular. On his account, the increasing depth of 
successive theories results automatically from methodological requirements that are met by all 
sciences at all times and that vouchsafe a unified conception of science, namely the requirements of 
falsifiability, simplicity and empirical content: “The ‘depth’ of a scientific theory seems to be most 
closely related to its simplicity and so to the wealth of its contents” (1997, p. 197). The circularity 
arises because, on the one hand, it is a sufficient condition for greater depth that successor theories 
correct and explain their precursors, while on the other hand, “explanation” is defined as providing 
greater depth: “the properties described by an explanatory theory must be, in some sense or other, 
deeper than those to be explained” – where deeper properties are the more general structural or 
relational properties which are the subject of more easily falsifiable statements (1997, 197, 203). 
 In light of Popper’s and then Kuhn’s challenge to the continuous and cumulative growth of     
scientific knowledge, Friedman approaches the task of reconstructing an overarching dynamics of 
reason in a far more subtle manner. Friedman builds on a criticism of Kuhn’s attempt to salvage 
science as a rational and progressive process and this criticism equally applies to Popper. And yet, 
Friedman’s far more subtle approach is also haunted by circularity. His proposal of a progressive 
conceptual development through the succession of theories also results automatically from his 
conception of the aims of science. This circularity is not vicious, but it insulates Friedman’s account 
of science, narrowing it in respect to alternative notions of objectivity and in respect to a mode of 
knowledge-production that might be termed technoscientific. This will be shown in the following 
pages, beginning with the manner in which Friedman’s Dynamics of Reason involves a circular 
conception of science as developing progressively and therefore exhibiting a dynamic progression 
of reason.  
 Friedman introduces his view of the dynamics of reason as an improvement upon Thomas     
Kuhn’s own attempt to show how an overarching movement of knowledge might persist even 
through scientific revolutions (Kuhn 1993, pp. 338-339). Without invoking a notion of depth, Kuhn 
suggests that paradigm-shifts lead to simpler accounts with greater scope. By way of criticism, 
Friedman points out that any such operational criterion must fall short if we are to take Kuhn’s 
paradigm shifts seriously: 
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If a clash of paradigms involves different conceptions of science and different standards for the 
evaluation of theories, these differences cannot be negotiated by a purely instrumental view of 
science in terms of falsifiability, empirical content, or simplicity. Instead, one needs to mobilize an 
idea of rationality that goes beyond “instrumental reason” by reflecting upon the very conditions 
under which the scientific movement of knowledge can proceed in light of competing frameworks 
of rational practice. In a rather different way than Popper, then, Friedman appeals to depth – here it 
consists in the philosophical examination of the common ground upon which one might maintain a 
unified notion of science. 
 The inadequacy of Kuhn’s response rests, in the end, on a failure clearly to distinguish between     
two very different aspects of human rationality. Following terminology introduced by Jürgen 
Habermas, I will call the first instrumental rationality and the second, communicative 
rationality:  “[…] This concept of communicative rationality carries connotations that ultimately 2
trace back to the central experience of the non-coercively uniting, consensus creating power of 
argumentative speech, in which different participants overcome their initially subjective points of 
view, and, thanks to the commonality of reasonably motivated convictions, assure themselves 
simultaneously of the unity of the objective world and the intersubjectivity of their context of 
life.” (Friedman, 2001, pp. 53-54, quoting Habermas, 1984, p. 10)  3
In order to reconstruct the scientific enterprise as a unified and coherent project with a dynamics of 
reason that persists through scientific revolutions, one therefore needs to reconstruct the efforts of 
communicative rationality to continuously assure us of our shared objective world by transforming 
subjective points of view into an intersubjectively binding agreement. This is underscored by 
Habermas in a passage strongly reminiscent of Peirce:  
 It is this point that can also be applied to Popper’s proposal.2
 Friedman provided his own translation. 3
!4
In the first place, there are powerful reasons from Kuhn’s own historiography for doubting 
whether any such puzzle-solving criteria are really permanent across revolutionary scientific 
change. […] In the second place, even if we admit that there are constant or permanent criteria 
or values definitive of scientific success, it remains entirely obscure how there can be an 
‘uncommitted’ or paradigm-independent standpoint for rationally assessing the satisfaction of 
such criteria. […] Finally, and in the third place […] it is surely uncontroversial that the 
scientific enterprise as a whole has in fact become an ever more efficient instrument for puzzle-
solving in this sense – for maximizing quantitative access, precision, simplicity, and so on in 
adjusting theoretical predictions to phenomenological results of measurement. What is 
controversial, rather, is the further idea that the scientific enterprise thereby counts as a 
privileged model or exemplar of rational knowledge […] (Friedman, 2001, pp. 51-53)
Mary Domski and Michael Dickson have taken up Friedman’s proposal by turning it into a 
manifesto for the integration of philosophy and history of science (Domski and Dickson 2010, see 
ch. III of Friedman 2001). What Popper calls “depth” cannot be had without realizing that the 
scientific enterprise is always also a philosophical enterprise, and vice versa. To reconstruct the 
discontinuous progression from one conceptual framework to another requires a history of concepts 
and how they are taken up by communicative rationality in various constructions of a shared world. 
This is a history of how concepts serve to schematize, take up, and process empirical data and how 
they enable particular ways of doing science. Such a history of concepts is also a history of the 
ways in which concepts set limits of knowledge and a history of the dynamics by which new 
conceptual frameworks enable new experiences. Philosophical reflection or communicative 
rationality focuses on precisely this transcendental or enabling character of concepts, and it is a 
philosophical history of concepts, therefore, that can elucidate from within our present space of 
conceptual possibilities how some earlier theoretical frameworks can be seen as a limiting case of 
our current best understanding. 
 It is readily apparent that Friedman’s deeper notion of depth is also haunted by circularity in     
respect to a preconceived aim of science. It is the aim of science “to assure ourselves of the unity of 
the objective world and the intersubjectivity of our context of life,” and it is therefore that the 
underlying continuity of science will be found in the philosophical reconstructions of just those 
conceptual means by which assurance of the objective world and of intersubjective contexts of life 
are attained: A philosophical history of the development of concepts is found to be fitting to science 
conceived as a philosophical endeavor.  The Dynamics of Reason therefore succeeds at providing a 4
vantage-point from which to reconstruct the history of science while preserving the identity of its 
movement of knowledge – Friedman’s dynamics unites the various ways of pursuing a single 
project, namely that of assuring ourselves of the world by means of concepts. Accordingly, the 
 Of course, to assure ourselves of the unity of the objective world does not require a unified theory of everything. The 4
piecemeal work of science helps provide this assurance simply by establishing the regularity, constancy, or lawfulness 
of certain portions of the world. By the same token, however, when science arrives at two fundamental theories that 
resist unification, this is viewed as a problem, perhaps scandal – a momentous piece of unfinished business! Also, the 
natural sciences assure us of the intersubjectivity of our context of life primarily by way of being a model community in 
which intersubjective agreement is legitimate and binding.
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The world gains objectivity only through counting as one and the same world for a community 
of speaking and acting subjects. The abstract concept of the world is a necessary condition if 
communicatively acting subjects are to reach understanding among themselves about what 
takes place in the world or is to be effected in it. Through this communicative practice they 
assure themselves at the same time of their common life-relations, and an intersubjectively 
shared lifeworld. (Habermas, 1984, p. 12; regarding Peirce compare Nordmann 2009)
unifying vantage point is epistemology or the history and theory of knowledge.  This is not a 5
vicious circle. If this is what science is – and why not define it most broadly along those lines? – the 
philosophical reconstruction of the history of concepts as enablers of scientific experience may well 
make for the most cogent integration of philosophy and history of science.  
 However, as soon as one grants this to Friedman, Domski and Dickson, a whole new set of     
questions opens up: What if there were research activities that do not aim to further intellectual 
understanding, to correctly represent the phenomena, to enable new experience through conceptual 
innovation and theory development, or to assure us of the unity of the objective world? And what if 
this, apparently “non-scientific” research was so predominant that the ongoing “scientific” practices 
of representation and explanation appeared side-lined? And what, finally, if this other kind of 
research also offered a vantage point from which to view the history of the sciences as a whole and 
marked only by incidental discontinuities? 
II.  PHILOSOPHY OF TECHNOLOGY MEETS HISTORY OF SCIENCE 
These questions will strike most philosophers of science as odd, perhaps sacrilegious. In a sense, 
what they allude to cannot be, since science and the philosophy of science are defined and circularly 
confined by the assumption of a persistent movement of knowledge that seeks to offer assurance of 
the objective world or mind-independent reality. Only against the background of this assumption, 
after all, did Kuhn’s claims of discontinuity become a matter of such great urgency and of needing 
to recover a unifying perspective. If our predicament as human beings is that of orienting ourselves 
and of requiring intersubjective assurance that we share a theoretical understanding of the world, 
this desire for orientation will be fueled and not abandoned in the face of falsifications, revolutions, 
or paradigm-shifts. Inversely, if there were a kind of research that does not seek to provide concepts 
and representations for the purposes of orientation, and that does not aim for intersubjective 
agreement on explanatory propositions, this could and would not be science at all.  
 From the perspective of the philosophy of technology, however, it is not at all obvious that we     
need such a scientific enterprise to assure us of the objectivity of a shared world. Accordingly, it is 
not obvious that this is what the scientific enterprise is all about. Of course, if we imagine a brute 
and unmediated encounter between the human mind and a bewildering array of sense data, there is 
an undeniable need for orientation, representation, and an assurance of agreement between mind 
and world. Historically speaking, this conception of our intellectual predicament posits a subject 
 One might ask here how close Friedman’s project is to “historical epistemology” as conceived by Gaston Bachelard, 5
Michel Foucault, or Ian Hacking.
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that stands naked just beyond the gates of paradise and has yet to embark on the arduous intellectual 
journey of developing theoretical knowledge and scientific understanding.  
 However, several thousand years into the scientific enterprise, the claim appears odd that people     
depend on science or philosophy or both “to assure themselves simultaneously of the unity of the 
objective world and the intersubjectivity of their context of life.” Technologies provide this 
assurance along with rules and regulations, building codes and industrial norms, protocols and 
routines and, in general, the need to adapt to the technical modalities that make our world work: A 
technologically unified objective world demands conformity to it. Of course, a great deal of 
scientific and technical knowledge has gone into this physical construction of our intersubjective 
context of life, and some of this knowledge may have been generated primarily in order to make 
sense of an otherwise incongruous world of appearances. But where philosophers of science 
consider the unending quest to ascertain agreement between mind and world, between theory and 
reality, philosophers of technology question the very idea that there are two distinct ontological 
realms – thought and physical reality – that somehow require to be bridged. For them, philosophy 
begins with human involvement in the world and thus with a practical coordination among humans 
and their environments – coordinations that most often are not preceded by accurate theoretical 
representations.  Accordingly, philosophers of technology seek to understand how human 6
experience is conditioned by technology and by the technologically organized lifeworld or context 
of life.   7
 These projects by philosophers of science and of technology are not mutually exclusive but they     
do qualify and relativize each other. Their contrast draws attention not only to so-called 
technoscientific research that seeks predominantly to acquire and demonstrate control of 
phenomena, but also to the fact that for many contemporary scientists their assurance of a shared 
objective world derives from their apparatus rather than from external validation through 
hypothesis-testing.  
 This is not the place to make the case for “technoscience” as a category complementary to     
“science” (compare Nordmann 2010). A thumbnail sketch must do: Theoretical physics or 
evolutionary biology serve as ideal examples of science as defined by Habermas or Friedman. Here, 
a scientific community comes together in a deliberative manner, proposes hypotheses and seeks to 
 Confronted with an early version of the present critique at a December 2006 workshop “The Philosophy of Michael 6
Friedman” in Copenhagen, Michael Friedman chose to accept the advice to take technology more seriously – by 
providing a brilliant improvised analysis of the calendar as a technology (see Friedman 2010). It is telling, of course, 
that he would choose a technology that is essentially representational and whose working depends on the accuracy of 
the representation that is validated in much the same way as are scientific theories. 
 There are many philosophers and philosophies of technology just as there many philosophies of science. But it is fairly 7
safe to say that philosophers of technology generally hold this view – just as it is fairly safe to say that philosophers of 
science are generally concerned about the relation of theory and reality as a, perhaps the central concern of the sciences. 
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validate them by developing appropriate evidence. Pharmacy, the engineering sciences, or 
nanotechnology are idealized exemplars of technoscience. Here, the laboratory is a site for the 
development of capabilities to master complexity. Theory is drawn upon and developed just to the 
extent that it helps stabilize these capabilities in vivo, in vitro, in silico, and, in conceptu. It is an 
open question for the philosophy of (techno)science whether objectivity consists in intersubjective 
agreement on theoretical propositions or whether it somehow derives from the technological 
infrastructure that supports the new capability (compare e.g. Chang 2004).  
 Indeed, it is worth considering to what extent also the most “theoretical” and explanatory     
sciences have been transformed by research technologies. For example, physical explanation 
frequently consists in the ability to model phenomena with the available theoretical tools even 
where the resulting explanatory model is intellectually intractable. The claim that something is an 
adequate or true explanation becomes absorbed in the broader claim that the phenomenon or 
process can be retrodicted or predicted by such a model (Johnson and Lenhard forthcoming). To be 
sure, on certain positivist conceptions of explanation, the identification of a true explanatory 
proposition was always thought to be an impossible task. However, this positivist claim was 
emphatically motivated by a critique of metaphysics and the desire to offer a radical alternative to 
scientific realism. In contrast, under technoscientific conditions, the difference between “what 
works” and “what is true” is systematically neglected because the reliable performance of 
technology is as good, if not better an index of truth than any inference from evidence that indicates 
an agreement of theory and reality. Thus, if a dreamed-up theory can be used to explain something, 
it is philosophically important to ask whether this is sufficient to make it a true explanation. But if a 
technical device like a computer can reliably simulate a phenomenon, its physical performance 
makes it superior to any dreamed-up theory and it is a moot point whether the simulation offers a 
true explanation or not. Indeed, this can be the case even where fictional entities or algorithms from 
dreamed-up theories are incorporated into the simulation (Batterman 2005, Winsberg 2006). To be 
sure, this notion of “internal technological validation” in the place of “external evidentiary 
validation” requires a philosophical reconstruction in its own right (Chang 2004, Tal 2010). The 
very question regarding these different kinds of validation cannot be posed, however, as long as 
science is understood as a project to secure intersubjective assurance of the objective world and as 
long as objective validity is thought to arise from agreement about the truth or empirical adequacy 
of propositions.  8
 Note that this not to say that traditional philosophy of science is committed to realism but only that it revolves around 8
the question of how to construe the relation of theory and reality – with the attendant disputes between various brands 
of realism, instrumentalism, constructivism.
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III.  FRIEDMAN’S HEIDEGGER – OBJECTIVITY AS INTERSUBJECTIVITY 
In the Dynamics of Reason, Friedman develops his conception of science and of a philosophical 
reconstruction of the history of science as an answer to the questions raised by Thomas Kuhn’s 
Structure of Scientific Revolutions. In Parting of the Ways he offers, albeit implicitly, another 
context for his account of the dynamics of reason. Here, the account represents a third way between 
Carnap’s proposal and Heidegger’s critique of this proposal. The need for such a third way appears 
at the beginning and at the end of Friedman’s book where he speaks of the real point of 
disagreement between Carnap and Heidegger as lying “in the circumstance that Heidegger denies 
while Carnap affirms the centrality of logic and the exact sciences.” Accordingly, if one fails to 
“make good on the idea of an underlying unity for the totality of symbolic forms” 
 we are finally left (in the present space of intellectual possibilities, of course) with the     
fundamental philosophical dilemma presented by Carnap and Heidegger after all. We can either, 
with Carnap, hold fast to formal logic as the ideal of universal validity and confine ourselves, 
accordingly, to the philosophy of mathematical exact sciences, or we can, with Heidegger, cut 
ourselves from logic and “exact thinking” generally, with the result that we ultimately renounce 
the ideal of truly universal validity itself. (Friedman 2000, pp. 12, 156)  9
It is perfectly plausible to assume that Friedman’s philosophical history of the dynamics of reason 
can fill this gap and expand the presently available space of intellectual possibilities by displaying 
not only the unity of science over time but also the unity between the mathematically exact and the 
non-mathematical sciences, including the Geisteswissenschaften (humanities). However, by 
positioning this search for the unity of science between Carnap’s proposal and Heidegger’s critique, 
Friedman again encapsulates his conception of science within the sphere of communicative 
rationality and of objectivity as resulting from intersubjective agreement. This becomes strikingly 
apparent from his neglect to look beyond the renunciation of “universal validity” to Heidegger’s 
alternative understanding of scientific objectivity or truth. Following Friedman into the forbidding 
territory of Heidegger’s thought, one might encounter his treatment of modern mathematical 
science as applied technology along with his view that technology is productive of truth, including 
scientific truth.   10
 Friedman here refers to Cassirer’s failed effort to show the unity of all symbolic forms. Parting of the Ways 9
concludes, however, with the urgent recommendation that Cassirer’s work and Cassirer’s ambitions should be taken up 
by contemporary philosophers of science (Friedman 2000, 159). 
 It is not at all necessary to refer to Heidegger for the purposes of a philosophy of technoscience, for non-propositional 10
or non-representational accounts of objectivity or truth, or for appreciating the technological setting – materially and 
intellectually – of contemporary research. It is entirely due to Friedman’s telling neglect of Heidegger’s theory of 
research that he becomes so prominent in this paper. 
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 Friedman’s generally careful and sensitive reconstruction of Heidegger’s “breathtakingly original     
exploration of the spiritual and philosophical predicament of the early twentieth century” fails to 
engage Heidegger’s own project when he identifies as the “weakness in Heidegger’s thinking” that 
he takes early 20th century revolutions in the foundations of mathematics and mathematical physics 
as devoid of genuine philosophical significance (Friedman 2000, p. 151). Indeed, Heidegger denies 
the philosophical centrality of logic and the exact sciences insofar as, for him, “logical forms of 
thought […] can have no philosophical explanatory value whatsoever” (Friedman 2000, p. 150 ). 
This is so, however, because logic and the exact sciences are philosophically central to Heidegger as 
explananda in his interpretation of Kant and in his critique of the modern age. Furthermore, in his 
explanation of these explananda the development of modern science plays a central role in two 
respects – regarding its grounding in the experience of handling things (Arbeitserfahrung) and its 
conception of being (Seinsentwurf) that juxtaposes subject and object in a particular way.   11
In his 1935/36 lectures on the fundamental questions of metaphysics, Heidegger frames this 
explanatory project in a way that appears to be addressed to the philosophical approach of the 
Vienna Circle. Noting that it seems quite natural to treat the nature of the thing, of the proposition, 
and of truth as being interdependent, he wants to know how we came to view these as 
interdependent. The thing is conceived as a carrier of properties, the proposition as predication (e.g., 
of properties to a thing), and it is only propositions that can be true or false, depending on whether 
they correctly predicate properties to things – or depending on whether they offer a correct 
representation (both in the sense of Vorstellung and Darstellung). Heidegger wishes to question the 
origin of this representational conception of truth: 
 We ask: is it a mere accident that the determination of the nature of the thing and the     
determination of the nature of the proposition and the determination of the nature of truth occur 
simultaneously, or are all of these connected among each other and perhaps necessarily so? And 
if this is so, how are they connected? (Heidegger 1984, p. 44, cf. 1967, p. 45)  12
According to Heidegger, this question identifies the explanandum of Kant’s as well as his own 
philosophy. Things appear in experience and in a propositional judgment in such a way that 
agreement on the proposition amounts to the determination of the thing. If one wants to understand 
 For his claim that modern science is grounded in a particular Arbeitserfahrung and Seinsentwurf, see Heidegger 11
1984 and 1967, p. 66. 
 One might object here that the passage makes Friedman’s point: If he had paid proper attention to the development of 12
quantum mechanics, Heidegger should have qualified his seemingly simplistic reference to things having properties in 
the understanding of scientific truth. However, Heidegger’s references to the life-sciences and to modern technology 
suggest an answer to this objection (1984, pp. 39f. and 50, cf. 1967, pp. 40f. and 51f.): We try to extend this conception 
of propositional truth as agreement with facts about things even to domains where it does not fit. And this is borne out 
not only by (ongoing) philosophical disputes about the interpretation of quantum mechanics, but also, for example, by 
the influence on the philosophy of Carnap and the Vienna Circle of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus and the idea that the 
meaning of a proposition consists in its truth-conditions.
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this construction, the seemingly natural connection between “universal validity” and intersubjective 
agreement needs to be questioned, as well. It is primarily this first step that is reconstructed in 
Friedman’s Parting of the Ways which considers the 1929 discussions of Heidegger and Cassirer in 
Davos and focuses especially on Rudolf Carnap’s presence in the audience. For Heidegger’s 
critique of “universal validity” Carnap provides the most formidable target in that he reconstructs 
science as a system of propositions – a reconstruction that conforms precisely to Heidegger’s claim 
that modern science seeks to secure in thought and thus render certain as intersubjectively valid the 
appearance of things. Accordingly, Friedman arrives at the uncomfortable alternative between 
Heidegger’s outright rejection of objectivity as universal validity and Carnap’s all too narrow 
logicist articulation of this kind of objectivity.  
 The starkness of this alternative became particularly apparent when, a few years after the Davos     
discussions, Carnap wrote an essay on “overcoming metaphysics” – a goal he shared with 
Heidegger who later wrote an essay with the same title. But it is the full title of Carnap’s essay that 
sets them apart: “The Overcoming of Metaphysics by the Logical Analysis of Language” (Carnap 
1959). In this essay, Carnap takes as his target an expression of Heidegger’s and demonstrates that it 
does not stand up to logical analysis. Heidegger responded to this in a passage quoted by Friedman. 
In it, he designates Carnap as one who does not overcome metaphysics at all but simply furthers a 
particular metaphysical program, namely the one that so neatly identifies agreement on the truth of 
propositional predications with the determination of things by their properties. This scheme of 
mutual determinations helps to “secure thought” by shifting attention from the things to the 
thoughts about the things and whether in a system of propositions these thoughts can draw 
agreement and take on the character of, ideally, logical certainty. Truth, in Heidegger’s idiom, is 
thus diverted into certainty: 
 Here [i.e., with Carnap] the last consequences of a mode of thinking which began with Descartes     
are brought to a conclusion: a mode of thinking according to which truth is no longer 
disclosedness of what is and thus accommodation and grounding of Dasein [being-there] in the 
disclosing being, but truth is rather diverted into certainty – to the mere securing of thought, and 
in fact the securing of mathematical thought against all that is not thinkable by it. The conception 
of truth as the securing of thought led to the definitive profaning [Entgötterung] of the world. 
The supposed “philosophical” tendency of mathematical-physical positivism wishes to supply 
the grounding of this position. It is no accident that this kind of “philosophy” wishes to supply 
the foundation of modern physics, in which all relations to nature are in fact destroyed. 
(Heidegger 1983, pp. 227f. as quoted in Friedman 2000, p. 22)  13
 It is frequently a question of translation whether Heidegger sounds more or less reasonable. In this case, for example, 13
“desacralization” might be more palatable than “profaning.” Also, we will see in the next section what Heidegger means 
when he claims that in modern physics all relations to nature are in fact destroyed. Even a charitable reading of this 
passage cannot ignore, however, that it resonates with a dark current of German thought that flows at least from 
romanticism to the attacks on “Jewish physics.”
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Heidegger’s polemic against Carnap and the Vienna Circle juxtaposes two conceptions of truth – 
“disclosedness of what is” and “securing thought by giving it certainty.” There is no explication 
here of what is meant by “disclosing what is,” but apparently this is not a matter of disclosing 
something in thought or in a representation but in reality. Whether or not one finds it plausible even 
to speak of “truth” here, Heidegger’s essays about technology help illuminate this peculiar 
employment of the term. Technology discloses what is by bringing forth what has not existed before 
(Heidegger 2000, pp 5-36). To the extent that scientific research reveals hitherto unobserved 
processes, phenomena, or effects, it proceeds technologically. Moreover, its experimental method, 
mathematical formalism and other representational techniques render nature as a whole subject to 
the technological exploitation of laws and regularities. In a sense, then, modern science is applied 
technology in that it presupposes a technological attitude. Along these lines, modern science 
discloses what it is when it is understood as applied technology. But this is not, according to 
Heidegger, how modern science understands itself or how it is understood by Carnap and the 
philosophy of science of his day. On their account, science secures thought and renders it certain 
[sichern] by putting it in the form of propositions that can be validated intersubjectively, either by 
finding it in agreement with what is actually given or by showing that it is entailed by certain other 
propositions, or both. The certainty of the truth results from the binding character of propositions to 
which everyone must subscribe who adopts a representational conception of truth and for whom the 
nature of things, the nature of propositions, and the nature of truth form an interdependent unity (cf. 
Heidegger 1962, §33 and Friedman 2000, pp. 56f.).  
 In other words, the notion of truth as propositions secured in definite logical and evidentiary     
relations to other propositions is only that apparently perfectly “natural” representational conception 
which is the explanandum in Heidegger’s philosophical project : Given that truth might also be the 14
business of poetry and art, technology and craft, and given that it might encompass many different 
ways of disclosing reality, how did it happen that the question of truth was narrowed down to 
questions of representation, of agreement among propositions and agreement of theory and reality? 
And thus, Heidegger begins to answer his question by describing Carnap’s mode of thinking as the 
last consequence of a metaphysical tradition that began with Descartes and that he later associated 
with the epoch of representation, that is, the modern era of world-views in which one makes 
pictures of the world (“Das Zeitalter des Weltbilds,” Heidegger 1977, pp. 75-115).  
 Again (see note 8 above) this is not to impute to philosophy of science a particular construal of thought ought to be 14
secured. From Heidegger’s lofty point of view, deductivist and semantic conceptions, empiricist and naturalist 
approaches are simply fighting over the best way to achieve the same goal. 
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 To be sure and as Friedman points out, by viewing the diversion of truth into representational     
certainty as a kind of metaphysical fall from grace, Heidegger appears to be paying a high prize. 
The notions of certainty or validity signify, after all, that finite humans are capable of producing 
transfinite knowledge. This amounts to the capacity of casting their knowledge into a form that 
dissociates it from the special finite and contingent conditions of its production. Paul Feyerabend 
referred to this as the “separability assumption” (Feyerabend 1999, pp. 131-146). And once one 
inquires about the forms in which such detached or dissociated knowledge can be universally valid 
or eternally true, one arrives at logic and mathematics.  15
 By considering these forms not as conditioning truth but as a distorting a more general and     
perhaps original notion of truth, Heidegger opens himself to Cassirer’s question whether, quoting 
Friedman, “he really wants to renounce such objectivity and to maintain instead that all truth is 
relative to Dasein [the concrete finite human being)]” (Friedman 2000, p. 2f., see also pp. 139, 144, 
156).  Indeed, in the record of the Davos disputation Cassirer poses the question in just these 16
terms: 
 Does Heidegger want to renounce this entire objectivity [Objektivität], without this form of     
absoluteness [Absolutheit] that Kant has represented in the ethical [sphere], the theoretical 
[sphere], and in the Critique of Judgement? Does he wish to withdraw entirely to the finite being, 
or, if not, where for him is the breakthrough to that sphere? (Cassirer in Heidegger 1991, p. 278, 
quoted by Friedman 2000, 139) 
Here, Cassirer associates the term objectivity with the transfinite, the absolute, the eternally valid.  17
When Heidegger responds to Cassirer, he takes up the problem of “eternally valid truths” and 
acknowledges the central problem of “getting beyond finitude” – but he does not associate with 
these the notions of objectivity or the absolute. After rejecting as insufficient the proposed standard 
of validity for “eternally valid truth,” he also recognizes the central problem of how to move 
beyond finitude. He views this problem as the concern of Kant’s transcendental philosophy: Finite 
human beings can conceive of themselves and their world in such a way that their world exists 
forever and is schematized mathematically such that knowledge of this world might also hold 
forever. This is what ontology is for. It creates the conditions under which finite beings can view 
 To be sure, contemporary Science Studies approaches might identify the forms that produce detachable knowledge 15
also in archives, institutions, networks. Arguably, though, these function only because there is inscribed in them a logic 
of preserving and transmitting truth. 
 This is not to suggest that Cassirer’s conception of truth is as thin as that of the Vienna Circle logical empiricist, or of 16
Lotze and other targets of Heidegger’s criticism.
 To be sure, Cassirer’s own account of the sources of object is rooted in his conception of symbolic forms and 17
provides richer notions than Carnap’s “exact thinking.” This is one reason, to be sure, why Friedman recommends a 
return to Cassirer.
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themselves as part of a uniform lawful nature. If however ontology is the requirement for finite 
beings to project themselves into a world that yields to human law-giving, this renders ontology 
itself an “index of finitude” (1991, p. 280). According to Heidegger, then, Kant’s transcendental 
reconstruction makes transparent just how humans can and do project themselves into a space of 
reasons or a kingdom of ends or a republic of letters in which truth can be discovered in the course 
of an eternal conversation (Nordmann 1995). But rather than provide a firm grounding, Kant is said 
to show that this projection into an eternal space of reasons is a “metaphysics of metaphysics.” It is 
a reconstruction of how we deceive ourselves, perhaps must deceive ourselves about our way of 
being in the world.  And the ultimate deception, of course, is the notion that Cassirer refuses to 18
surrender, namely that as finite beings humans are nevertheless capable of transfinite knowledge. 
And indeed, Heidegger might add, this deception can be maintained, but only by seeking refuge in 
logic and mathematics and in an ontology that renders the whole of nature susceptible to 
mathematical treatment.  
 While Heidegger’s account may appear sketchier than those of Kant or Cassirer, he does provide     
a comprehensive sketch of how and why transfinite knowledge is produced – and this is an attempt 
simultaneously to understand why it appears so natural to us that we know of things and their 
properties once we agree intersubjectively on the propositional representations of these things. And 
thus, contrary to Cassirer’s and Friedman’s suspicion, Heidegger appears to have no difficulty 
understanding what validity and certainty are and how we might obtain “eternally valid 
propositions” once we adopt and push to its last consequence a metaphysical mode of thinking.  He 19
does not consider this metaphysical mode of thinking an absolute foundation that grounds the 
possibility of eternal truth. Rather, he understands it as a powerful stratagem to deny, perhaps 
overcome or transcend human finitude. Along similar lines, he does not believe that “objectivity” 
has been recovered when one acknowledges the unknowability of the things themselves and offers 
as a substitute the representation of their appearances in the framework of mathematical logic. 
 Notions of intersubjectivity and objectivity run through Friedman’s Parting of the Ways,     
reflecting their difference in meaning.  In Friedman’s quote from Cassirer (just above), 20
 Charles Sanders Peirce and contemporary science studies, one might add here, are continuing this Kantian project, as 18
conceived by Heidegger, when they pursue the question how we can contingently construct a world that is not a 
contingent and constructed world, how we construct a world that is made up of the eternal laws that apparently cause us 
to discover them (compare the discussion of Peirce in Friedman, 2001, and Nordmann, 2009).
 To be sure, Cassirer’s suspicion is that Heidegger wishes to “renounce” this notion of eternal validity. This suspicion 19
is justified only to the extent that Heidegger exposes the conceit of modern subjects to negate their finitude. By the 
same token, he also explains that for modern subjects in the Cartesian tradition the aspiration toward eternal validity 
cannot possibly be renounced.
 The following passage is of particular importance for Friedman’s own proposal and his recommendation to look to 20
Cassirer for a middle ground between Carnap and Heidegger: “whereas Carnap’s ideal of truly universal intersubjective 
communicability is precisely that which is expressible in rigorous logical notation, Cassirer wants to extend it (also as a 
regulative ideal) to all the other symbolic forms as well” (Friedman 2000, p. 153). 
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“objectivity” refers to transfinite truth. The term “objectivity” is offered tentatively as a translation 
of Carnap’s claim that philosophy’s “neue Sachlichkeit” affords objective knowledge like any other 
science (Friedman 2000, p. 18). Also, the term refers to intersubjectivity (2000, pp. 56f., referring to 
Heidegger 1962, paragraph 33): Intersubjectivity is possible where there is no access to the object; 
it is a substitute notion that was advanced by a critical epistemology that finds itself cut off from the 
thing themselves and only knows things as they are given to subjectivity. And once, in contrast, 
Friedman uses “objectivity” to translate Heidegger’s term Gegenständlichkeit – a term that 
designates a certain way of relating to the things, namely by way of opposing the subject and the 
object: 
 The suspicion directed against “logic,” whose conclusive degeneration may be seen in logistic     
[modern mathematical logic], arises from the knowledge of that thinking that finds its source in 
the truth of being, but not in the consideration of the objectivity [Gegenständlichkeit] of what is. 
Exact thinking is never the most rigorous thinking, if rigor receives its essence otherwise from 
the mode of strenousness with which knowledge always maintains the relation to what is 
essential in what is. Exact thinking ties itself down solely in calculation with what is and serves 
this [end] exclusively. (Heidegger 1996, p. 306, quoted in Friedman 2000, p. 13) 
In this rather dense passage, the terms “calculation” and “exactitude” take the place of “validity” 
and “certainty.” They pertain to propositions that refer to each other, including the propositions that 
describe what is. Such calculation stays on the plane of what is given to subjectivity, it involves 
only lateral movements as connections are forged among and between descriptive and theoretical 
statements, allowing them to become secured in a network of propositions. These calculations 
consider the “objectivity” [Gegenständlichkeit] of what appears to the observing and knowing 
subject. According to Heidegger, they do not consider the “truth of being” that is disclosed, for 
example, by technology or art, and they do not make the truly rigorous effort to maintain a relation 
to “what is essential in what is.”  
 Formulations like these raise a skeptical question: Can such an invocation of the truth of being     
have any bearing for a philosophy of science that has come into its own by rejecting any such 
appeals? With this question we shift from thought and representation to making and building, from 
the subject-object dichotomy to the “worldliness” of things, from the self-understanding of modern 
science to technoscience, from Heidegger’s book on Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics (1991) 
to his lectures on the fundamental questions of metaphysics that were published as Question of the 
Thing: On Kant’s Doctrine of Transcendental Principles (1984) and his essay on “The 
Thing” (2000, pp. 165-187). 
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IV.  THE OTHER HEIDEGGER – TECHNOSCIENTIFIC OBJECTIVITY 
When Heidegger complains about truth as mere intersubjective agreement and when he speaks 
instead of a “thinking that finds its source in the truth of being,” this suggests that he rejects the 
idealism, conventionalism, or constructivism of Kant and the Neokantians and that he advances a 
more realist conception of truth.  However, this reading of Heidegger misses the point entirely, 21
since the issue of realism vs. idealism or constructivism arises only when we debate whether there 
can be representations of a mind-independent reality. However, Heidegger is no realist in that he 
agrees with Kant regarding the non-representability of the things in themselves. Things must always 
be represented not as they are but only as they appear to us, that is, as objects of experience and 
objects of nature and thus in the framework of metaphysics (Heidegger 1984, pp. 130f.). 
Representations necessarily “leap over” the things and do not encounter them “in the truth of 
being.” According to Heidegger, Kant himself reflected this predicament as opposed to the rather 
more naïve Neokantians of Heidegger’s day (pp. 244-246). Not Kant himself, but only the 
Neokantians delude themselves that what they are engaged in is a theory of knowledge that is 
simultaneously a critique, if not rejection of metaphysics: 
 ‘Theory of knowledge‘ is the name for the increasingly constitutional incapacity of     
contemporary metaphysics to know its own nature and what it is grounded in. Any discussion of 
the ‚metaphysics of knowledge‘ is similarly misguided. In truth this is the metaphysics of the 
object (Gegenstand), that is, of being as object (Gegenstand), as object for a subject. (Heidegger 
1983, p. 73) 
When something is an object of knowledge for a subject, or when someone is the subject that 
represents an object, the opposition between subject and object relies on the metaphysical 
construction of the Cartesian modern subject. When Heidegger contemplates an encounter with the 
things “in the truth of being,” he seeks to step outside this modern tradition. Paradigmatically, this 
encounter takes place not ONLY when things are brought forth in technology and art, but also in 
science when it is considered as “productive research” (aufschließende Forschung, Heidegger 1984, 
p. 67).  Indeed, Heidegger considered especially the most mathematized sciences like classical 22
physics as technology. Though the best-known statements to this effect can be found in “The 
Question concerning Technology” (2000, pp. 5-36), the idea appears in earlier writings such as the 
 Indeed, Friedman refers repeatedly to Heidegger’s realism (e.g., 2000, pp. 53-55, 58-61).21
 It is worth noting that here and elsewhere Heidegger foregrounds the notion of research (Forschung) rather than 22
science or inquiry. 
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lectures on Kant and The Question of the Thing. Physics is not a matter of hypotheses and theories 
but of producing our modern world : 
 It is said that modern technology is incomparable to any previous one because it relies on the     
exact natural science of the modern age. But in the meantime one has recognized more clearly 
that the inverse holds, too: as an experimental science, physics of the modern age depends on 
technical apparatus and the progress of instrument-making.  
  Physics of the modern age is experimental physics not because it uses apparatus to question         
nature, but the other way around: because physics, considered even as pure theory, coaxes nature 
to present itself as a predictively calculable system of forces, the experiment is called upon to 
find out whether and how nature answers as it has been asked to present itself. […] Since the 
essence of modern technology consists in [this way of challenging or framing], it must employ 
this exact natural science. And this produces the deceptive appearance that technology is applied 
science. (Heidegger 2000, pp. 15, 22-24)  
  We cannot adopt a popular line of thought by saying: What is being said about [Eddington’s]         
scientific table number 2, about spiral nebulae and the dying sun, are just the views and theories 
of physics. The response to this is: This physics is at the bottom of our gigantic power plants, 
airplanes, telephone and television, and all of technology which has transformed the earth and 
humans beings more than they are aware of. These are realities, not views that are held by some 
sort of researchers that are “detached” from life. (Heidegger 1984, p. 13) 
Rather than reject science’s claim to universal validity, Heidegger suggests that technology and, by 
implication, science have more to offer than true propositions – by bringing forth things, science 
and technology are productive of truth, if by “truth” one means that something has been disclosed 
or brought to the light of day (2000, pp. 14f.). And rather than disparage science as “mere 
technology,” Heidegger views the modern world as resulting from modern science, or more 
precisely, as resulting from a transformation of technology that implicated science. Technology was 
transformed from a poetic “bringing forth” of things, dwellings, and gifts to a demanding 
expectation that “challenges” all of nature to yield calculable behaviors which suit human purposes. 
The analogous transformation of science consisted in the transition from Aristotelian to Galilean 
and especially Newtonian science. Heidegger reflects on this transformation in order to characterize 
the starting point of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason that begins with the fact of Newtonian and 
decidedly not of Aristotelian science. Condensing 40 pages into one sentence, one might summarize 
Heidegger’s point as follows: After everything had its own nature for Aristotle, there is only one all-
encompassing nature for Newton – and the shift from one conception of nature to the next changes 
what it is that technology and science bring forth. In the modern world, science discloses nature as a 
“calculable system of effective forces [berechenbarer Wirkungszusammenhang von Kräften],” that 
is, as a resource for the realization of human purposes (2000, p. 27, see also 22):  
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 Nature is no longer that which determines manner of motion and the location of a body by way     
of its inner power. Nature is now the axiomatically designed realm of a homogeneous spatio-
temporal context of motion, such that bodies can be bodies only by being inserted and bound up 
[verspannt] within it. (Heidegger 1984, p. 93, see also 89) 
According to Heidegger, Kant reflects the tension between the non-representability of the things in 
themselves and the ways in which bodies can be bodies in a Newtonian conception of nature. Kant’s 
transcendental reconstruction of Newtonian science should not be mistaken for a grounding or 
foundation or justification of Newtonian science but as a reconstruction that brings to light its 
metaphysics – as such complementary to the previously noted interpretation, according to which 
Kant’s theory of experience does not so much serve to ground the possibility of truth but to clarify 
how human finitude is overcome. Accordingly Heidegger takes Kant’s critical reconstruction as a 
preparatory step for his explanation of this metaphysics, including its conception of nature, 
confrontation of subject and object, and construal of objectivity as intersubjectivity. Newtonian 
science now appears part of a specifically modern technology with its recruitment of the whole of 
nature as a resource: It uses mathematics on the one hand, laboratory apparatus on the other to 
transform the world into a set of lawful relations that deliver predictable behaviors in a calculable 
manner. 
 Despite first appearances, therefore, Heidegger’s critique of modern science is not that it is     
applied technology. All science is technological in that it brings forth, discloses, or makes available 
things, processes, or phenomena. Instead, Heidegger is critical of modern science disclosing a 
modern world in which nature is a calculable system of forces and in which objectivity is the 
agreement on propositions that describe this system. He arrives at an alternative conception of 
objectivity by comparing the different worlds that are brought forth by Aristotelian and Newtonian 
science. And though it does not to need to refer to Heidegger’s analysis at all, a philosophy of 
technoscience can draw on this alternative conception when it considers those research practices 
that are not subordinate to the search primarily of true theories, propositions, or representations. 
Only a sketch of this can be suggested here. 
 According to Rom Harré (2003), the experimental production of a thing, process or phenomenon     
is the affordance of an apparatus/world complex. Heidegger characterizes this in a very similar way 
as a way of concentrating or gathering together bits and pieces of the world such that, taken 
together, they grant something (Heidegger 2000, 165-187). Whether natural or manufactured, things 
are concentrations of materials and of agency that allow other things and processes to take place. 
They are mundane or worldly in that they, literally, incorporate the world in themselves – the social 
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and natural world are invested in them. Heidegger here adopts Aristotle four-fold notion of causality 
when he says that things assemble or gather together matter, form, purpose, and agency. Moreover, 
this assemblage affords something, just as a pitcher affords, grants, or permits the storage and 
pouring of liquids. In other words, the gathering together (versammeln) of the four causes brings 
forth or discloses a thing that affords something (schenken).  This formulation can be adapted to 23
the case of technoscience: The gathering together in the laboratory of theoretical knowledge, 
instruments, skills, and human purposes affords a process or a thing which serves as immediate 
evidence for the successful acquisition of the capability to produce this thing or to exhibit what it 
can do (Nordmann 2008 and forthcoming). Along these lines and without referring to Heidegger, 
Rom Harré has paired mundane examples with those from technoscientific laboratories: 
 Generalizing the notion of affordance we can say that an apparatus/world complex can afford     
things. For instance, wheat, yeast, and a stove can afford loaves of bread. A lathe can afford chair 
legs, and a discharge tube can afford gamma rays.  
  An apparatus/world complex can also afford activities. For instance, some rapids can afford     
whitewater rafting. A reamer can afford boring, and a chemistry laboratory can afford 
gravimetric analyses. (2003, p. 37) 
This is not the place to detail the history and meaning of “affordance” as a technoscientific cousin 
to the scientific notion of “disposition” (Harré 2003, p. 37): Water has the disposition to form ice at 
a certain temperature, and it affords the quenching of thirst when it is drunk. Of the various 
similarities and differences between dispositions and affordances, two are especially relevant in 
regard to the question of objectivity: Whereas dispositions are latent properties that belong to the 
nature of a thing and that become manifest only if and when the proper conditions obtain, 
affordances are known features of human interactions with a thing. And whereas knowledge of 
dispositional properties requires validation of lawful or probabilistic relations between stimulus 
conditions and responses, affordances are exhibited and attain robustness through the technological 
criterion of simple functioning.  24
 This account relies primarily on Heidegger’s 1950 essay “The Thing” (2000, pp. 165-187). However, In that essay 23
and its discussion of a pitcher the thing is said to be worldly in that it gathers together heaven and earth, mortals and 
immortals. The discussion in the 1953 essay on the “Question concerning technology” is less obscure in its reference to 
Aristotle’s four causes that are gathered together in the making of a silver chalice (2000, pp. 9-13).
 Compare Cartwright (1989) for an account of “nature’s capacities” that do not require lawful regularity but attain 24
salience, exhibit their efficacy and become visible in the technological setting e.g. of a double-blind experiment. Here, 
Cartwright moves away from a scientific perspective (regarding the agreement of theory and reality) to a 
technoscientific perspective (regarding the acquisition and demonstration of capabilities to control phenomena). 
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V.  CONCLUSION – NORMATIVE GROUNDS 
According to Paul Forman, it was virtually impossible until about 1980 to appreciate Heidegger’s 
claim that science is applied technology. Forman shows that some of the most astute readers of 
Heidegger dismissed his claim as hyperbole that cannot be taken literally (Forman 2007, pp. 8-10). 
Only with the rising prominence of the technosciences and only with a cultural orientation that 
subordinates scientific research to technological development was it possible for Heidegger’s 
project to gain traction – and with this rediscovery of Heidegger came the resurgence of the “thing” 
rather than the object, fact, or sense-datum as a unit of historical and philosophical analysis.   25
 In the preceding pages, a similar argument was made for Friedman’s reception of Heidegger. He     
reads him without acknowledging even the possibility that the relation between science and 
technology could be inverted. As long as the common concern of science, epistemology, and 
philosophy of science is seen as “assuring us of the unity of the objective world” (Habermas) or as 
“securing objects of experience in thought” (modern epistemology as seen by Heidegger), the role 
of technology is only to serve as an aide or instrument in accomplishing that task. Heidegger is not 
only a critic of this conception of science but challenges us to consider an alternative view of the 
common concern of science, epistemology, and philosophy of technoscience. On this view, modern 
science brings forth things and along with them produces the modern world including its “gigantic 
power plants, airplanes, telephone and television, and all of technology which has transformed the 
earth and humans beings more than they are aware of” – it does so not as a by-product or 
application of theoretical knowledge but by employing conceptual tools that harness nature as a 
resource for such world-making.  
 However, one does not have to accept Heidegger’s challenge and view all of science     
technologically. And quite possibly on normative grounds, Friedman does not. Instead, one can 
insist upon the cultural significance of the opposition between science and technoscience. As 
defined by Friedman (and Habermas), science should be conceived normatively in terms of 
communicative rationality and universal Enlightenment, and thus decidedly in contrast to 
instrumental reason and technology. The notion of technoscience lacks this normative dimension. It 
is defined as the acquisition and demonstration of conceptual and practical control of phenomena 
such that the science/technology distinction becomes irrelevant.  
 These different ways of valuing scientific research – valuing it as a search for critical     
understanding or as a strategy for experimental innovation – are hugely significant and would 
 Compare the consideration of things by Davis Baird, Paul Rabinow, Hans-Jörg Rheinberger, Bruno Latour, Lorainne 25
Daston, Bernadette Bensaude-Vincent, and others.
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remain significant even if it were the case that all of modern science can be redescribed as 
technoscience (Nordmann 2010). To the extent that the philosophical tradition of Cassirer, Carnap, 
and Friedman values science for its non-coercively consensus-creating dynamics of reason, it 
cannot and ought not see Heidegger as a philosopher of science. This is all the more reason, 
however, to pursue a philosophy of technoscience that uncovers the inherent normativity of 
technoscientific research, its epistemic and technical values, rules of inference, and criteria of 
validation. Once we appreciate how differently these complementary analytic perspectives 
reconstruct even the same research activities, we can then debate the shift in recent decades of the 
cultural prestige accorded to the ideals of critical science and innovative technoscience, of 
communicative and instrumental rationality. And for this debate, Michael Friedman has provided an 
invaluable contribution by working out the intellectual unity of an idea of scientific knowledge that 
persists through a wide variety of disciplines and the succession of paradigms. 
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